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V 
IS second the this 
this Court vacated the trial court's judgment reforming Jeff and Karen Owen's ("Owens") deed to 
include the Orphan parcel (thereby relocating the express easement). Regan v. Jeff D., 157 Idaho 
758,339 P.3d 1162 (2014). This Court also reversed the trial court's alternative basis for locating 
the easement on the Orphan Parcel, which stated that Brent and Moura Regan ("Regans") enjoyed 
a thirty-foot prescriptive easement across the Orphan Parcel in the same location of the easement 
after the reformation of the Owens' deed. Id at 1169. 
Following remand, the Owens moved for summary judgment on the basis that any claim 
the Regans had to a prescriptive easement across the Orphan Parcel was extinguished by the tax 
sale of that parcel to Kootenai County according to LC. § 63-1009. The district court applied the 
plain language of the statute to the undisputed facts presented at summary judgment and entered 
judgment for the Owens. 
In their appeal, Regans contend that the district court failed to read LC. § 63-1009 in pari 
materia with other relevant Idaho real property statutes. Regans also claim the district court erred 
in failing to consider a multitude of issues never raised by Regans below. Regans again raise in 
this appeal the issue of deed reformation, which was rejected by this Court in the first appeal. 
After Regans filed their notice of appeal, Senate Bill 1388, as amended, was signed into 
law by Governor Otter on March 30, 2016 which altered LC. § 63-1009. This Court rejected a 
stipulation from the parties this legislation did not apply to the present appeal, and required Regans 
to file a supplemental brief. In their Supplemental Brief, Regans contend that Senate Bill 1388 
either does not retroactively amend LC. § 63-1009 or if the bill is retroactive, its applications to 
this case is unconstitutional. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Identification of Documents in the Record 
On this second appeal, this Court ordered the appeal record be augmented to include the 
Clerk's Record, Reporter's Transcript and Exhibits, which were electronically filed in Supreme 
Cou..rt No. 40848. The record in Supreme Court No. 40848 was augmented by the appellant to 
include pleadings not included even though the entire electronic clerk's record was requested on 
appeal. 1 The Clerk's Record in No. 43848 only includes requested documents which duplicated 
no documents in the Clerk's Record in No. 40848. As an aid to the reader of this brief, the 
recitation to the various records will be as follows: 
• The Clerk's Record in No. 40848 will be identified as "40848 R" followed by the page 
number; 
• The Augmented Record in No. 40848 will be identified as "40848 AR" followed by the 
page number; 
• The Clerk's Record in No. 43848 will be identified as "43848 R" followed by the page 
number. 
B. Nature of the Case 
Following remand, the remaining issue before the trial court was Regans claim of a 
prescriptive easement across the Orphan Parcel. The district court determined as a matter of law 
I.C. § 63-1009 was clear and unambiguous. 43848 R pp. 69-77. Applying the undisputed facts 
presented at summary judgment, the trial court entered judgment for the Owens and the 
prescriptive easement claim was dismissed. Id. 
1 Regans recited to the augmented record in their opening brief, but did not seek to have it included in the current 
appeal. It is anticipated that Regans will present an unopposed motion to include the augmented record in this 
appeal. 
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Regans appeal the judgment decision and resulting final judgment However, 
the majority before Court were not issues raised below and one was even 
decided by this Court in the first appeal. Moreover, there is no factual support in the record for 
many of the new issues presented on this appeal by the Regans. 
The primary issue before this Court is statutory interpretation. The district court 
determined the statute was unambiguous as written. Regans ask this Court to vacate the district 
court's final judgment because they believe the result of such an approach was not intended by the 
legislature. However, the district court properly acted within its power and authority in deciding 
the summary judgment and entering its final judgment. 
C. Course of Proceedings 
The Regans provide this Court a creative rendition of the facts in the case. This response 
clarifies and supplements some of those aspects. 
On March 11, 2011, Regans filed a complaint in Kootenai County alleging: ( 1) interference 
with express easement rights across the north 30' of the Owen's parcel claimed to benefit four 
separate parcels of property; (2) interference with an implied easement across the Orphan Parcel 
for the benefit of four parcels of property; (3) a request to reform the Owens' deed to adjust the 
north property boundary to encompass the Orphan Parcel for the benefit of four parcels of property 
owned by Regan, and ( 4) a claim that Regan established a prescriptive easement across a portion 
of the Orphan Parcel which benefitted the same four parcels of property. 40848 R pp. 14-22. On 
April 19, the Owens answered the complaint and admitted the existence of the express easement 
for the benefit of Parcel II only and denied the remaining claims. 40848 R. pp. 71-74; 40848 AR 
pp. 163-171. 
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On September 1, 2011, Regan moved for partial summary judgment, with supporting 
affidavits and memorandum, to declare the existence of the express easement across the Owen 
parcel and the right to develop it for road and utility purposes for the benefit of all four parcels 
identified in the complaint. 40848 AR pp. 142-162. The Owens filed a response to the Regans' 
motion on September 15, 2011, acknowledging Parcel II described in the complaint was benefittcd 
by the express easement and alleging the remaining parcels were not entitled to the benefit of the 
express easement. 40848 AR pp. 163-171. The court entered an order on September 29, 2011, 
granting summary judgment regarding Parcel II only. 40848 R pp. 76-80. Thereafter, Regan 
engaged a contractor to develop a road across the north 30' of the Owens' parcel. The work done 
comprised grubbing and clearing the easement, widening it, removing at least four large trees and 
brush from the easement, and bringing in road base material. 40848 AR pp. 181,243,255, 301; 
408485/31/12PreliminaryHearingTrp.152,ll.2-19, 158,11.9-15,24-25; 159,11. 1-6;p.160,ll. 
14-22;p.102,l.25,p.163,p.164,l.1-4; 178,11.23-25, 179-180. 
On October 27, 2011, the Regans moved for a preliminary injunction and for a finding of 
contempt against the Owens, with supporting affidavits and a notice of hearing of the contempt 
charge (which did not comply with I.R.C.P. 75). 40848 AR pp. 172-215. The contempt was based 
upon the Owens calling the sheriff when the Regans' contractor, upon direction by Brent Regan, 
dumped the debris from the road construction outside the easement in the Owens' front yard. Id. 
On March 16, 2012, Owen moved for leave to amend their pleadings to add a counterclaim 
for trespass based upon the Regans' contractor dumping the construction debris outside the 
boundaries of the easement onto their front yard at Brent Regan's direction. 40848 AR pp. 326-
336. Ultimately, the Regans dismissed their contempt claim and made an offer of judgment on the 
trespass claim, which was accepted. 40848 AR 686-687; 40848 R pp. 113-115. 
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Following remand, on August 7, 2015, Owens filed their third motion for summary 
judgment arguing that the Regans' claim for prescriptive easement was extinguished by issuance 
of the tax deed. 43848 R pp. 23-35. Regans opposed the motion based on foreign law, policy 
arguments, and evidence from the Kootenai County Treasurer targeted at material facts according 
to the foreign law they requested the trial court adopt. 43848 R pp. 36-60. 
The district court heard oral argument on Owens' third motion for summary judgment on 
September 4, 2015. 43848 Tr. pp. 1-26. The district court issued a written decision on the motion 
for summary judgment on October 9, 2015, granting summary judgment for Owens based on the 
application of LC. § 63-1009 to the undisputed material facts presented to the district court. 43848 
R pp. 69-77. A final judgment, prepared by Regans' counsel, was entered on October 30, 2015, 
which included return of the Regans' preliminary injunction bond to them. 43848 R pp. 78-80. 
This judgment was followed by an amended final judgment entered December 17, 2015 which 
released the bond to the Owens. 43848 R pp. 86-88. The Regans appealed the original final 
judgment on December 10, 2015, and filed an amended notice of appeal on January 27, 2016. 
43848 R. pp. 81-85, 90-94. 
After the appeal was filed, and Regans submitted their opening brief, Senate Bill 1388, as 
amended, was signed into law by Governor Otter on March 30, 2016, amending LC. § 63-1009 to 
specifically state that a conveyance by tax sale only conveys title free of liens and mortgages of a 
monetary nature if proper notice was sent to the party in interest. LC.§ 63-1009 (amended March 
30, 2016).2 This amendment removed the prior language of "encumbrances." On June 27, 2016, 
Regans filed a Supplemental Brief addressing whether the 2016 amendment had retroactive 
2 Unless otherwise specifically indicated herein, all references in this brief to I.C. § 63-1009 refer to the statute prior 
to its amendment in 2016. 
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application as applied to 
§ 63-1009 or if the 
D. Statement of the Facts 
not 
IS 
This Court already knows of the underlying facts of this case from the first appeal and the 
additional relevant facts for this appeal are as follows: 
On May 27, 2015, Owens' counsel deposed Brent Regan and asked him if his prescriptive 
easement enhanced the value of the Orphan Parcel: 
Q. Does the access road enhance the value of your property? 
A Yes. 
Q. Does it enhance the value of the Owen's parcel? 
A Couldn't say. 
Q. How does it enhance the value of your property? 
A By giving me access to Bonnell Road. 
Q. And isn't it true you have an express easement across the Owen parcel that gives 
access to Bonnell Road? 
A Yes. 
43848 R p. 33, L. 11-20. Brent Regan did not claim the prescriptive easement added any value to 
the Orphan Parcel. By affidavit dated August 7, 2015, Jeff Owen testified that an easement across 
the Orphan Parcel: 1) is not essential to the Owens' use and enjoyment of the land; 2) detracted 
from the Owens' use and enjoyment because of increased traffic and prevented them from freely 
using their land; and 3) did not enhance the value of the land, but instead diminished it. 43848 R 
pp. 28-29. 
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ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether Owens are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees on appeaL 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The Owens request an award ofreasonable attorney fees on appeal pursuant to LC. §§ 12-
121, 12-123(2)(a), and I.AR. 41. Idaho statute provides this Court with discretion to award 
attorney fees to a prevailing party: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing 
party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute 
which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees. 
LC. § 121. By rule the Idaho Supreme Court has limited the application of this discretionary award 
to instances where the Court finds "that the case was brought, pursued or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." IRCP 54( e )(1 ). An award of attorney fees under 
LC. § 12-121 is appropriate when "the Court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was 
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Chavez v. Barrus, 
146 Idaho 212, 225, 192 P.3d 1036, 1049 (2008). The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
define or provide explanation of whether a case is "brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
unreasonable or without foundation," but is within the broad and sound discretion of the Court. 
Anderson v. Goodlijfe, 140 Idaho 446, 449, 95 P.3d 64, 67 (2004). Historically this Court has 
refused to exercise its discretion in awarding attorney fees under LC. § 12-121 if the losing party 
has presented at least on legitimate issue, even when their other "factual or legal claims [were] 
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Michalkv. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224,235,220 P.3d 
580, 591 (2009). However, recently this Court has held that "[a]pportionrnent of attorney fees is 
appropriate for those elements of the case that were frivolous, unreasonable, and without 
7 
foundation." Idaho Military Historical Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, P.3d 1072, 
Besides LC. § 1 121, this Court "may award reasonable attorney's fees to any party to that 
action adversely affected by frivolous conduct." LC.§ 12-123(2)(a). Frivolous conduct is defined 
as follows: 
"Frivolous conduct" means conduct of a party to a civil action or of his counsel of 
record that satisfies either of the following: 
(i) It obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the 
civil action; 
(ii) It is not supported in fact or warranted under existing law and cannot be 
supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law. 
LC.§ I2-123(1)(b). 
In this case, the Regans' claim of prescriptive easement was the only issue remaining after 
this Court's remand on the first appeal. Despite the narrow scope of the remand and the limited 
proceedings following the remand and leading up to this appeal, the Regans now present a litany 
of issues to this Court on appeal that were: 1) never raised below, 2) decided on the first appeal, 
or 3) are not supported by the record. The only issues the Regans properly raise before this Court 
are 1) whether the district court erred in interpreting and applying I.C. § 63-1009, 2) whether the 
2016 amendment of LC. § 63-1009 should be applied retroactively, and 3) whether Regans are 
entitled to costs and attorney fees if they prevail on appeal. 
Regans agree on appeal that the amendment to LC. § 63-1009 does not apply to this case, 
so this issue is not pursued by them on appeal. Regan's claims of error by the district court are 
frivolous and without foundation, mostly because they were never raised below. Because Regans' 
appeal is without merit, this Court should award Owens their reasonable attorney fees on appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
L STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court's review of a decision on summary judgment is the same standard used by the 
district court. Ada Cty. Bd of Equalization v. Highlands, Inc., 141 Idaho 202, 205-06, 108 P.3d 
349, 352-53 (2005). "Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material 
fact and the case can be decided as a matter oflaw." Id.; I.R.C.P. 56(c). Interpreting a statute is a 
question of law over which this Court exercises free review. State v. Maidwell, 137 Idaho 424, 
426, 50 P.3d 439,441 (2002). This Court also exercises free review over constitutional questions. 
CDA Dairy Queen, Inc. v. State Ins. Fund, 154 Idaho 379,382,299 P.3d 186, 189 (2013). 
II. THE 2016 AMENDMENT OF I.C. § 63-1009 SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED 
RETROACTIVELY IN THIS CASE 
After this appeal was filed, the legislature passed legislation intended to abrogate Owens' 
vested property rights acquired in the tax deed issued to them pursuant to LC. § 63-1009. Since 
determination of this issue could be dispositive, it is addressed first in this response. 
While it is uncommon for the Respondents to agree with Appellants' argument on appeal, 
Owens agree with Regans' conclusion that the 2016 amendment of LC. § 63-1009 should not apply 
retroactively to the facts of this case. However, Owens arrives at their conclusion based on a 
different analysis of the applicable law. 
Effective March 30, 2016, LC.§ 63-1009 was amended to read as follows: 
EFFECT OF TAX DEED AS CONVEYANCE. The deed conveys to the grantee 
the right, title, and interest held by the record owner or owners, provided that the 
title conveyed by the deed shall be free of any recorded purchase contract, 
mortgage, deed of trust, security interest, lien, or lease, so long as notice has been 
sent to the party in interest as provided in sections 63-201(17) and 63-1005, Idaho 
Code, and the lien for property taxes, assessments, charges, interest, and penalties 
for which the lien is foreclosed and in satisfaction of which the property is sold. 
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§ 63-1009 (2016). The plain language of this amended statute clearly does not provide for the 
conveyance property by tax deed free and clear of the encumbrances that the prior statute 
contemplated. Under the plain language of the amended statute, a prescriptive easement would 
survive conveyance of the servient estate by tax deed. Regans contend this amended statute is not 
expressly intended to apply retroactively to past conveyances. Supplemental Brief, pp. 5-13. 
Owens respectfully disagree with Regans' analysis. However, Owens agree with Regans' ultimate 
conclusion that retroactive application of the amended statute would violate both the United States 
and Idaho Constitutions. 
A. Senate Bill 1388 is Expressly Retroactive 
A statute is retroactive when it "changes the legal effect of previous transactions or events." 
Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 43, 232 P.3d 813, 821 (2010) (citing Engen v. James, 92 Idaho 690, 
695, 448 P.2d 977, 982 (1969)). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that purchasers of property 
from the county acquire vested rights to that property. Washington County v. Paradis, 38 Idaho 
364,369,222 P. 775, 777 (1923). If the rights vested in a purchaser are subsequently changed by 
legislation, that legislation is retroactive. 
Retroactive legislation in Idaho is prohibited unless there is express legislative intent for 
retroactive application: "No part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly so 
declared." LC.§ 73-101; Hillv. Am. Family Mut. Jns. Co., 150 Idaho 619,628,249 P.3d 812,821 
(2011) (no statute is retroactive unless the Legislature expressly declares that it is); Johnson v. 
Stoddard, 96 Idaho 230, 234, 526 P.2d 835, 839 (1974) (no law in Idaho will be applied 
retroactively absent a clear legislative intent to that effect). Enacting language of the legislature 
that "clearly refers to the past as well as to the future" manifests a clear "intent to make the law 
retroactive." Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 938, 318 P.3d 918, 928 (2014) citing Peavy v. 
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Idaho 
legislation at 
(19 
16. 
2016 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 273 § 8 at 758, eff. Mar. 30, 2016 (hereinafter cited as "Senate Bill 
1388"). Section 8 of Senate Bill 1388, which deals with application of the act, states: "Being a 
clarification of existing law, the Legislature does not view the application of this amendment to 
prior conveyances as retroactive legislation." Senate Bill 1388, § 8. Relying solely on this sentence 
alone it would appear that the Legislature did not intend the amendment of LC. § 63-1009 (also 
referred to as "the amended statute") to apply retroactively. However, that sentence is at odds with 
the next sentence of Section 8, which states: "In any event, the Legislature expressly intends that 
these amendments shall be interpreted to apply to any and all conveyances by tax deed, past or 
future." Id. (emphasis added). Apparently the first sentence was an expression by the Legislature 
on how it would rule upon the statute were it a court. 
A review of the statutory language in its totality leads to the conclusion that the Idaho 
Legislature did intend the amended statute to apply retroactively. "In any event" is similar to saying 
"regardless" or "nevertheless." In any event, OXFORD DICTIONARY, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/in-any-event (last visited 11 July, 2016). By 
using the words "in any event," the Legislature meant to disregard the first sentence of Section 8 
of the Bill exclaiming its view that the legislation was not meant to be retroactive, and say instead 
that the legislation applied retroactively, to past conveyances. 
The effect of applying the statute retroactively would be retroactive legislation because it 
would change the vested rights of Owens as purchasers from the county. When the Orphan Parcel 
was conveyed to Owens in 2005 by tax deed, Owens obtained a vested right to the real property, 
free of the claim of a prescriptive easement. 43848 R pp. 73-76. Now with the passage of 
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subsequent legislation, that vested right is purportedly changed to ovvnership subject to a claim of 
a prescriptive easement. Application of the amended statute to the title vested in Owens by the tax 
deed conveyance retroactively changes the Owens' vested rights and imposes new legal 
obligations and duties on them (i.e. those of a servient estate) that were not in effect under the 
previous legislation. Because application of the amended statute to the title held by Owens changes 
their vested rights in the Orphan it is retroactive legislation. Stuart, 149 Idaho at 43, 232 P.3d at 
821. Having found the amended statute is retroactive legislation, this Court should then find the 
amended version of § 63-1009 impermissibly violates both the United States and the Idaho 
Constitutions when applied to this case. 
B. Retroactive Application of the Amended Statute is Unconstitutional 
Retroactively applying the amended statute to the tax deed conveyance of the Orphan 
Parcel is unconstitutional because it impairs the vested rights that contract conveyed to Owens 
without serving an important public purpose. Article I, § 10, cl. 1 of the United States Constitution 
states: "No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Article I § 
16 of the Idaho Constitution similarly states: "No .. .law impairing the obligation of contracts shall 
ever be passed." IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 16. 
In Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Bashor, 36 Idaho 818,822,214 P. 209,213 (1923), 
the Idaho Supreme Court defined what it meant for a law to impair the obligations of contracts: 
"The obligation of a contract is impaired by a statute which alters its terms, by imposing new 
conditions or dispensing with existing conditions, or which adds new duties or releases or lessens 
any part of the contractual obligation or substantially defeats its ends." Id. 
Statutory interference with contract is not a per se violation of the constitutions, but must 
first be evaluated under a three-step framework applicable to both the United States and Idaho 
constitutions: 
The first step is to determine whether the challenged legislative enactment "has 
operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship." This threshold 
inquiry also has three parts: 1) whether a contractual relationship exists, 2) whether 
the challenged legislative enactment impairs that relationship, and 3) whether that 
impairment is substantial ... lf the chailenged legislative action is found to 
substantially impair a contract, the analysis then proceeds to the remaining two 
steps: whether the act serves "an important public purpose," and whether the act is 
"reasonable and necessary" to advance that purpose. 
CDA Dairy Queen, Inc. v. State Ins. Fund, 154 Idaho 379, 383-88, 299 P.3d 186, 190-95 (2013). 
1. Retroactive Application of the Amended Statute is a Substantial 
Impairment of the Contractual Relationship 
Retroactive application of the amended statute is a substantial impairment of the contract 
between Owens and Kootenai County because there was a contract promising Owens absolute title 
free and clear of all encumbrances. The new legislation creates an encumbrance on the property3 
which decreases the value of the Orphan Parcel. There is no question in Idaho that the law in 
effect when property is conveyed by tax deed becomes contractual terms between the county and 
the purchaser: 
Questions concerning the effect of a tax sale as a transfer of title, or the rights of 
the purchaser and the validity of his title, are to be determined by the law in force 
at the time the sale was made, which law indeed constitutes a contract between the 
county and the purchaser, the terms of which cannot be impaired by subsequent 
legislation. 
Larson v. Gilderoy, 45 Idaho 764, 267 P. 234, 235 (1928). "The laws which subsist at the time 
and place of the making of a contract ... enter into and form a part of it." CDA Dairy Queen, 154 
Idaho at 388,299 P.3d at 195 (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 188 (1992)). 
Indeed, conveyance of real property by tax deed is a "contract which cannot be impaired by 
3 Assuming arguendo that Regans can prove the necessary elements of a prescriptive easement claim. 
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legislative enactment, the purchaser from the county having acquired a vested right Paradis, 38 
Idaho at 369,222 P. at 777. Accordingly, when Owens purchased the Orphan Parcel, the terms of 
that contract with the county included the law of LC.§ 63-1009 as it then existed, which said that 
Owens received absolute title free of all encumbrances. 
The next question is whether the chailenged legislative act impairs the contractual 
relationship. Id. at 387, 299 P.3d at 194. "To impair a contract is to 'diminish the value of' the 
contract." Id. at 388,299 P.3d at 195 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 819 (Bryan A. Gardner ed., 
9th ed., West 2009)). As noted in the statement of facts, Owens testified by affidavit that a 
prescriptive easement across the Orphan Parcel would diminish its value. 
Lastly: 
If the court determines that a legislative act has impaired a contract, the final step 
in the threshold inquiry is to decide whether the contractual impairment is 
substantial. In making this determination, courts consider several factors, such as 
whether the impairment eliminates an important contractual right, defeats an 
expectation of the parties, or creates a significant financial hardship for one party. 
CDA Dairy Queen, 154 Idaho at 388-89, 299 P.3d at 195-96. In United States Trust Co. of New 
York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 9-10, 18-19 (1977), the United States Supreme Court determined 
the repeal of a statute which protected the interests of bondholders constituted a substantial 
impairment to the contract between bondholders and the states, holding the retroactive repeal 
eliminated an important security provision. A case decided by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit explained "when considering substantial impairment, we focus on the 
importance of the term which is impaired, not the dollar amount." S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa 
Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 892 (9th Cir. 2003). The fees charged under the amended statute in S. Cal Gas 
Co. "impair[ed] a right at the heart of the [contract]." Id. 
There is no question that the quality of the title conveyed to Owens by tax deed is an 
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important right that contract. Whether Owens receive an unencumbered piece of real property 
versus property subject to an easement is important contractual right. Similar to the 
contractual provision in S. Cal. Gas Co., which was at the heart of the contract, the right to take 
title free of all encumbrances is at the heart of the conveyance between the Owens and Kootenai 
County. Moreover, retroactively burdening that property with an easement substantially impairs 
the value of the contract to the Owens. 43 848 R p. 29. Retroactive application also creates new 
duties restricting the Owens free use of their property, and casting them in the position of a servient 
estate. These are substantial impairments of their contractual rights. 
2. Retroactive Application of the Amended Statute in this Case does not 
Serve an Important Public Purpose 
Because the challenged legislative action substantially impairs the Owens' contract, the 
analysis must turn to the remaining stops outlined in CDA Dairy Queen, Inc. v. State Ins. Fund, 
supra. In determining "whether the act serves an important public purpose" this Court has 
explained "substantial impairment may be permissible where there is a 'significant and legitimate 
public purpose behind the regulation, such as the remedying of a broad and general social or 
economic problem."' CDA Dairy Queen, 154 Idaho at 388, 299 P.3d at 195 (quoting Energy 
Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400,411 (1983)). 
This Court should find there was not a legitimate and important public purpose behind the 
broad retroactive application of the amended statute. The Senate claimed allowing the original 
I. C. § 63-1009 to pass absolute title to the land free of all encumbrances would "result in the 
elimination of public utility easements, ditch rights, public highways and rights-of-way, 
conservation easements, and all manner of third-party rights in the land." Senate Bill 1388, § 1. 
This is not only an overstatement of the supposed public policy problem, it is inaccurate. 
While it is true the original LC. § 63-1009 could eliminate certain third party property 
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rights, it only did so if the third party rights were an "encumbrance" to the land. An easement is 
an encumbrance if it impairs the and usefulness public 
way and utility easements are not encumbrances because they benefit the land over which they 
cross. See Hunt v. Bremer, 47 Idaho 490, 276 P. 964, 965 (1929) (public easements, public rights 
of way, and irrigation canals are not encumbrances). See also Newmeyer v. Roush, 21 Idaho 106, 
120 P. 464 (1912) (a public right of way is not an encumbrance); Schurger v. Moorman, 20 Idaho 
97, 117 P. 122 (1911) (an irrigation canal is not an encumbrance); Campagna v. Parker, 116 Idaho 
734, 779 P.2d 409 (1989) (public easements, or easements beneficially affecting the land, do not 
constitute encumbrances within the meaning of the covenant against encumbrances). Seemingly 
the legislature was unaware of this long standing case law when expressing its fears. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the public is best served by predictability 
and stability regarding their contractual rights and responsibilities: "The largest category of cases 
in which we have applied the presumption against statutory retroactivity has involved new 
provisions affecting contractual or property rights, matters in which predictability and stability 
are of prime importance. Landgraf v. US! Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 271 (1994). Indeed, 
with respect to the amended statute before the Court, the public would be better served by 
application of the amended statute prospectively only and not altering prior contractual rights. 
Thus, there is no important public purpose in interfering with private contractual rights since the 
public easements the Senate expressed concern about losing were already safe under the existing 
case law. 
16 
3. The Amended Statute is 
Important Public Purpose 
Reasonable and Necessary to Advance an 
With the final step of analysis "the Court must still determine whether the act is based 
'upon reasonable conditions and [is] of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying its 
adoption."' CDA Dairy Queen, 154 Idaho at 388,299 P.3d at 195 (quoting United States Trust Co. 
of New Yorkv. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977)). The amended statute is too broad, and instead 
of protecting only those important public rights it seeks to preserve, it also interferes with private 
contractual rights. 
To be a reasonable and necessary retroactive legislation, the amended statute should simply 
have limited its retroactive application to public easements or rights benefitting the public, rather 
than all non-monetary interests in land, including private easements. There is a strong public 
policy against interference with contracts that requires those private contractual rights not be 
tampered with retroactively. 
As United States Supreme Court Justice Scalia stated in Landgraf "the largest category of 
cases in which we have 'applied the presumption against statutory retroactivity ... involved new 
provisions effecting contractual or property rights, matters in which predictability and stability are 
of prime importance."' Landgraf 511 U.S. at 271. It is much more important for this Court to 
recognize a policy of encouraging stability and predictability in the execution of contractual and 
property rights, rather than upset the longstanding presumption that the laws in existence at the 
time of the execution of the contract enter into the contract itself. To apply the amended version 
of LC. § 63-1009 retroactively would upset the vested rights of persons who have acquired 
property in the State of Idaho through tax deed conveyances, including the Owens. Most 
importantiy, it was not reasonable or necessary for the Legislature to interfere with these private 
contractual rights to protect the public rights over which it was concerned. The amended statute 
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is too broad and should have been more narrowly tailored to address the important public purpose 
such a need really The more appropriate resolution of the Legislature's supposed public 
policy emergency would be for the amended LC. § 63-1009 to apply prospectively to future 
transactions by tax deed. This would allow the Legislature's intentions to shape the future of tax 
deed conveyances without destroying the vested and bargained-for rights of current property 
owners like the Owens. 
The act as written was not reasonable and necessary to advance its stated purpose. To 
prevent the Owens from being deprived of their vested rights under the version of LC. § 63-1009 
by which they took title, the Court must interpret the amended LC. § 63-1009 as impermissibly 
retroactive legislation under the facts and circumstances of the present case. The contractual tax 
deed conveyance from Kootenai County to the Owens must be governed by the former version of 
LC. § 63-1009, the law in force at the time of the contract. To hold otherwise would violate the 
Idaho Constitution and the United States Constitution. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
REGANS' PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT WAS AN ENCUMBRANCE 
EXTINGUISHED BY TAX SALE OF THE ORPHAN PARCEL 
The district court properly applied LC. § 63-1009 when it determined "[i]t is undisputed 
that the Regans' claim of a prescriptive easement would constitute an encumbrance upon Owens' 
land they received from the county after it was acquired by tax deed" and dismissed the Regans' 
claim for a prescriptive easement. 43848 R pp. 75-76, 86-87. Idaho Code Section 63-1009 states 
the grantee of real property by tax deed receives "absolute title to the land described therein, free 
of all encumbrances," with exception for mortgages, subsequent property tax liens, and liens for 
special assessments, none of which are relevant to the issue before the Court. LC.§ 63-1009. The 
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district court correctly interpreted "encumbrances" to include the Regans' alleged prescriptive 
easement across the Orphan Parcel. 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free 
review. Maidwell, 137 Idaho at 426, 50 P.3d at 441. The goal of statutory interpretation is to 
ascertain legislative intent. State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973 (2011). 
Therefore, interpretation of a statute begins with the literal words of the statute. State v. Burnight, 
132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999). The words of the statute should be given their 
plain, usual, and ordinary meanings, giving effect to all the words and provisions of the statute. 
Id.; LC. § 73-113(1). "When the statutory language is unambiguous, courts must give effect to 
the legislature's clearly expressed intent without engaging in statutory construction." Saint 
Alphonsus Reg'! ivied. Ctr. v. Gooding Cty., 159 Idaho 84,356 P.3d 377, 379-80 (2015) (emphasis 
added); LC. § 73-113(1). Where a statute is unambiguous, its plain language controls and this 
Court will not engage in statutory construction. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 151 
Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011). This Court does not have the authority to revise a 
statute that is unambiguous as written "on the ground that it is patently absurd or would produce 
absurd results when construed as written." Id. at 896, 265 P.3d at 509. 
A statute is only ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable 
construction. Porter v. Bd. of Trs., Preston Sch. Dist. No. 201, 141 Idaho 11, 14, 105 P.3d 671, 
674 (2004). "Ambiguity is not established merely because differing interpretations are presented 
to a court; otherwise, all statutes subject to litigation would be considered ambiguous." Id. If a 
statute is not ambiguous, "this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written." 
State v. Thiel, 158 Idaho 103, 108, 343 P.3d 1110, 1115 (2015) (internal quotations omitted). 
When a statute is unambiguous, there is no reason to consult legislative history or other extrinsic 
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evidence "for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature." City of Sun 
v. Sun Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 (1993). 
In this case, the district court correctly held that LC. § 63-1009 is clear and unambiguous. 
The district court correctly applied the statute as written when it held that the Owens took title to 
the Orphan Parcel free of the Regans' prescriptive easement claim. The district court also correctly 
rejected argument that the statute should be applied contrary to its plain language. 
A. Idaho Code Section 63-1009 is Not Ambiguous 
Neither below, nor on appeal, have the Regans attempted to argue that the language of LC. 
§ 63-1009 is ambiguous. The Regans conceded to the trial court that the statute is unambiguous: 
"The statute is problematic, we admit that. It says what it says, that a tax deed conveys absolute 
title fee of all encumbrances with certain specific exceptions." 43848 Summary Judgment Tr pp. 
11, L. 21-24. 
On appeal, the Regans simply argue this Court should interpret the terms "absolute title" 
and "encumbrances" differently because the result would be more favorable to them and perhaps 
others. Appellant's Opening Brief, 16-1 7, 3 0. However, Regans' requests ignore the plain, usual, 
and ordinary meanings of these terms and violate the rules of statutory interpretation. Idaho Code 
Section 63-1009 is not ambiguous and was correctly applied by the district court. 
According to Section 63-1009, a conveyance of real property by tax deed "conveys to the 
grantee the absolute title to the land therein; free of all encumbrances ... " I.C. § 63-1009 does not 
define "absolute title" or "encumbrances," nor does Title 63 of the Idaho Code. Since absolute 
title and encumbrances are not specifically defined they should be given their "plain, usual, and 
ordinary meaning[s]." Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. The Court can ascertain a 
word's plain, usual, and ordinary meaning by reference to a legal dictionary. See Hayes v. City of 
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Plummer, 159 Idaho 168, 1 1 (2015) (The Court's use of Black's Dictionary 
provided the with 
1. The Plain, Usual, and Ordinary Meaning of "Absolute Title" Means a 
Fee Simple Interest 
Absolute title is defined as "[ a ln exclusive title to land; a title that excludes all others not 
compatible with it. See fee simple absolute under FEE SIMPLE." Black's Law Dictionary 1622 
(Bryan A. Gardner ed., 9th ed., West 2009). Fee simple absolute is defined as "[a]n estate of 
indefinite or potentially infinite duration" and a fee simple is defined as "the broadest property 
interest allowed by law." Black's Law Dictionary 691 (Bryan A. Gardner ed., 9th ed., West 2009). 
Absolute title is not defined in Idaho statute. However, absolute title is synonymous in Idaho case 
law with fee simple or fee simple absolute title in real property. See Argyle v. Slemaker, 99 Idaho 
544,548,585 P.2d 954,958 (1978) (mvnership ofreal property redundantly described as "absolute 
title in fee simple"). Absolute title is often used in Idaho case law to contrast fee simple ownership 
with title held merely as a security for an obligation. See State v. Snyder, 71 Idaho 454, 460, 233 
P .2d 802, 806 (1951) ( court determined that execution and delivery of bill of sale was not 
conveyance of absolute title but a form of security for a loan). 
There is no argument presented by Regans that absolute title means anything other than fee 
simple absolute ownership of real property. In fact, that is in essence the definition the Regans 
request this Court adopt: "the term 'absolute title' in Idaho Code section 63-1009 is most logically 
defined as a title to property that cannot be divested by the occurrence of a future event." 
Appellants' Opening Brief, 30 (emphasis added). 
While recognizing the broadness of the definition of absolute title, the Regans fail to give 
effect to the remaining plain language of the statute and fail to recognize the "absolute title" 
conveyed by the statute is further modified as "free of all encumbrances." LC.§ 63-1009. That is 
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language the district court focused on when it determined the quality of the fee simple 
ownership the Owens received when they were issued a tax deed from the County. The district 
court never defined "absolute title" in its memorandum decision or final judgment, so it is puzzling 
how the Regans can claim "the trial court erred in ruling that the phrase 'absolute title' in Idaho 
Code section 63-1009 means title free from a prescriptive easement." Appellants' Opening Brief, 
32; compare 43848 R p. 69-76, 86-87. On appeal Regans never provide this Court with a citation 
to the record where the district court defined "absolute title" to mean something that is mutually 
exclusive of real property burdened by a prescriptive easement. The district court never made such 
a pronouncement. 
The question before the district court was whether the conveyed fee simple 
ownership was burdened by a prescriptive easement claim which survived the issuance of the tax 
deed. The most important part of the statute for the case at hand is what constitutes an 
encumbrance, and whether the Regans' alleged prescriptive easement was an encumbrance under 
LC. § 63-1009. As discussed below, the district court correctly determined that the Regans' 
prescriptive easement was an encumbrance because it was an interest in land that was not essential 
to Owens' enjoyment and did not increase the value of the Orphan Parcel. 
2. The Term "Encumbrances" in I.C. § 67-1009 included the Regans' 
Claim of a Prescriptive Easement over the Orphan Parcel 
The Regans invite this Court to limit the meaning of an encumbrance to only those which 
secure financial interests. Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 16. This Court has addressed the meaning 
of an encumbrance on more than one occasion in cases related to the warranty of title and covenant 
against encumbrances. As early as 1912, this Court held a reserved access easement in a deed was 
an encumbrance. Newmyer v. Roush, 21 Idaho 106, 116-117, 120 P. 464 (1912). The Court 
reasoned that such an easement is an encumbrance because it is a right that "clearly impair[ s J the 
and usefulness of said tract, and the right to the use was not granted for the purpose of 
benefiting land itself or increasing its value." Id. 
Later in 1929, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the definition of encumbrances found 
in C. S. § 5385, the statutory predecessor of LC. § 55-613, with identical language as§ 55-613 
today, and held "[a]side from these statutory provisions [LC. § 55-613], an incumbrance may 
otherwise be defined to be any right or interest in land to the diminution of its value, but consistent 
with the free transfer of the fee ... [and] embraces all cases in which the owner does not acquire the 
complete dominion over the land which his grant apparently implies." Hunt v. Bremer, 47 Idaho 
490, 276 P. 964, 965 (1929) ( emphasis added). Simply put, an encumbrance is "a right or interest 
which diminishes the value of the land." Id. The Hunt Court qualified and narrowed its definition 
to exclude those rights that are essential to the land's enjoyment and enhance the land's value. Id. 
Examples of essential or value enhancing "encumbrances" include public easements, public rights 
of way, and irrigation canals. Id. The holding from Hunt is that any interest in real property less 
than a fee simple interest is an encumbrance unless the interest is essential to the enjoyment of the 
land and enhances the land's value. That general definition was applied to an easement as follows: 
Id. 
It is apparent that, if an incumbrance is a right or interest which diminishes the 
value of the land, no easement or other right should be regarded as an incumbrance, 
which is essential to its enjoyment and by which its value is enhanced. The modem 
trend, now firmly established, is that the existence of certain public easements, or 
easements beneficially affecting the land, such as a public road right of way 
(Newmyer v. Roush, 21 Idaho, 106, 120 P. 464, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 433) or canal 
(Schurger v. Moorman, 20 Idaho, 97, 117 P. 122, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 313, Ann. Cas. 
1912D, 1114), do not constitute incumbrances, within the meaning of covenants 
against incumbrances. 
In Hoffer v. Callister, 137 Idaho 291, 47 P.3d 1261 (2002), the Hoffer Court specifically 
addressed LC. § 55-613 and the meaning of the term "encumbrances" in the context of a zoning 
violation notice. The Hoffer Court held the statute is inclusive, rather than exclusive, in its 
meaning and cited Hunt v. Bremer, 47 Idaho 490,276 P. 964 (1929) as authority for the proposition 
there are other types of encumbrances that aren't listed in the statute. Id. at 294, 47 P.3d at 1264. 
The Hoffer Court also cited to Kaelker v. Turnbull, 127 Idaho 262, 265-66, 899 P.2d 972, 975-76 
(1995) (holding that the covenant of title is breached when there are hostile titles, superior in fact 
to those of the grantor.) Id. The Hoffer Court concluded "[a]s the language from these cases 
makes clear, an encumbrance that does not fit within one of the categories enumerated in LC. § 
55-613 must be a right, interest, or hostile title relating to the land. Id. The Hoffer Court also 
cited with approval the holding from Hunt v. Bremer, supra, that "an encumbrance may otherwise 
be defmed by any right or interest in land to the diminution of its value, but consistent with the 
free transfer of the fee. It does not depend upon the extent or amount of diminution in value, but 
embraces all cases in which the owner does not acquire the complete dominion over the land which 
his grant apparently implies." Id. The prescriptive easement claimed by the Regans fits this 
definition. It is an interest in the land that diminishes its value. 
Most recently in 2014, in the first appeal of this case, this Court again approved the 
definition of encumbrance found in Hunt: 
An encumbrance is "any right or interest in land to the diminution of its value, but 
consistent with the free transfer of the fee." Hunt v. Bremer, 47 Idaho 490,494,276 
P. 964, 965 (1929). Whether something is an encumbrance does not depend upon 
the extent to which it diminishes the value of the land. An encumbrance "embraces 
all cases in which the owner does not acquire the complete dominion over the land 
which his grant apparently implies." Id An easement is not an encumbrance if the 
easement is essential to the enjoyment of the land and it enhances the land's value. 
Id There is no finding by the district court that the alleged prescriptive easement 
across the Orphan Parcel increased its value. 
Regan v. Owen, 157 Idaho 758, 765, 339 P.3d 1162, 1169 (2014). The definition found in Hunt 
follows Newmyer and Hoffer, supra, and I. C. § 5 5-613. Therefore, the definition of encumbrances 
as used in LC. § 63-1009 includes easements that are not essential to the enjoyment of the land 
and do not enhance the land's value. 
A statute is only ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable 
construction. Porter, 141 Idaho at 14, 105 P.3d at 674 (emphasis added). All constructions 
proposed by Regans conflict with the plain language of the statute and Idaho case law, and are 
unreasonable. When a statute is unambiguous, it must be followed as written. This Court has 
consistently declined invitations to disregard unambiguous statutory language to reach a desired 
outcome not supported by the language of the statute. Such is the case with the argument made 
by the Regans. Regans urge this Court, contrary to its clear holdings, to construe unambiguous 
language in LC. § 63-1009 to avoid an outcome which they characterize as unjust. 
Regans ask this Court to consider the legislative intent of the 2016 amendment to LC.§ 
63-1009 to interpret the prior statute to conclude that an easement is not an encumbrance. 
Supplemental Brief, pp. 7-12. However, that approach ignores the proper steps of statutory 
interpretation, wherein the Court must give effect to unambiguous statutory language without 
further engaging in statutory construction. Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 159 Idaho at 86-87, 
356 P.3d at 379-80; LC. § 73-113(1). The current legislature's explanation of its former body's 
historical intent cannot supplant the application and effect of the clear and unambiguous statutory 
language contained in the prior statute4. Therefore, the current statements of the legislature do not 
control the interpretation of LC. § 63-1009. The plain language of the statute provides that the 
Orphan Parcel was conveyed free of encumbrances, which includes Regans' claimed prescriptive 
easement. 
4 When the fonner LC.§ 63-1009 was written, the legislature presumably knew of the Court's interpretation of 
encumbrances as such cases were decided long before the fonner version ofl.C. § 63-1009 was adopted. 
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Prescriptive Easement is an 
to use land of another for a that is 
not inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner." Abbott v. Nampa School Dist. 
131, 119 Idaho 544, 548, 808 P.2d 1289, 1293 (1991). An easement can be an encumbrance 
embraced in LC. § 55-613 based upon the holding in Hoffer discussed above. An easement can 
be an encumbrance under the holding in Hunt discussed above when it diminishes the land's value. 
An easement can be an encumbrance under Newmyer, supra, if it impairs the value and usefulness 
of the land, and the right to the use was not granted for the purpose of benefiting the land itself or 
increasing its value. 
The district court was correct when it concluded "[t]he plain language in Idaho Code 
Section 63-1009 is clear." 43848 R p. 75. The district court committed no error when it concluded 
the Regans' prescriptive easement claim was an encumbrance because it was not essential to the 
enjoyment of the Orphan Parcel and did not enhance the value of the land. 43848 R p. 75. Regan 
failed to present the district court with any evidence that the prescriptive easement was essential 
to the Owens' enjoyment of the Orphan Parcel or enhanced the Orphan Parcel's value. 43848 R 
pp. 45-47, 72. To the contrary, Jeff Owen testified that a prescriptive easement across the Orphan 
Parcel was not essential to the use and enjoyment of the Orphan Parcel, and detracted from the use 
and enjoyment of the Orphan Parcel because it increased traffic and prevented the Owens' 
complete and free use of the parcel. 43848 R pp. 28-29, 71. The district court was also provided 
deposition testimony from Brent Regan who "couldn't say" if the easement enhanced the value of 
the Orphan Parcel for the Owens. 43848 R pp. 33, 71. 
At summary judgment, the district court was presented with undisputed facts and correctly 
applied LC. § 63-1009 to those facts. Therefore, the district court's final judgment dismissing 
Regans' prescriptive easement claim should be affirmed. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Rejected Regans' Policy Arguments Against 
Applying I.C. § 63-1009 as Written 
The district court was correct in construing Idaho Code Section 63-1009 as written because 
the statute was unambiguous. "When the statutory language is unambiguous, courts must give 
effect to the legislature's clearly expressed intent without engaging in statutory construction." Saint 
Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 159 Idaho at 86-87, 356 P.3d at 379-80 (emphasis added). 
When a statute is unambiguous, there is no reason to consult legislative history or other 
extrinsic evidence "for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature." City 
of Sun Valley, 123 Idaho at 667, 851 P.2d at 963. If the statute as written is socially or otherwise 
unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not judicial." Ver ska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med. 
Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 892-93, 265 P.3d 502, 505-06 (2011) citing In re Estate of Miller, 143 Idaho 
565, 567, 149 P.3d 840, 842 (2006). Even if this Court believes that an unambiguous statute as 
written is absurd or produces absurd results, this Court does not have authority to revise the statute 
or interpret it differently. Ver ska, 151 Idaho at 896, 265 P .3d at 509. 
For instance, in Sims v. ACI Nw., Inc., 157 Idaho 906,342 P.3d 618,625 (2015) in response 
to policy arguments from ACI Northwest and the Idaho Land Title Association to interpret a statute 
other than written, this Court stated "any change to the statutory procedure for mechanic's lien 
enforcement is best suited for the legislature." Sims, 157 Idaho at 906, 342 P.3d at 625. A harsh 
result for ACI, who lost its mechanic's lien, but that is the correct relationship between the 
judiciary and the legislature, and the relationship this Court should maintain on this appeal. 
district court recognized the proper branch of government to enact and modify 
it "[t]he rigid language statute may create inequitable or 
oppressive results, however, it is not the province of the trial court to rewrite or impose an 
application contrary to the clearly stated language." 43848 R p. 75. Despite the policy arguments 
raised by the Regans and the claim of inequitable results should the trial court be affirmed, this 
Court has made it clear that it will apply an unambiguous statute as written. This Court should 
reject Regans' policy arguments and affirm the district court's dismissal of Regans' prescriptive 
easement claim. 
C. The Trial Court Correctly Rejected Argument Based on Foreign Law 
The district court was correct in rejecting arguments based on foreign law to interpret LC. 
§ 63-1009 because the statute is clear and unambiguous. The goal of statutory interpretation is to 
ascertain legislative intent. State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863,866,264 P.3d 970,973 (2011). "When 
the statutory language is unambiguous, courts must give effect to the legislature's clearly 
expressed intent without engaging in statutory construction." Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 159 
Idaho at 86-87, 356 P.3d at 379-80 (emphasis added). When a statute is unambiguous, there is no 
reason to consult legislative history or other extrinsic evidence "for the purpose of altering the 
clearly expressed intent of the legislature." City of Sun Valley, 123 Idaho at 667, 851 P.2d at 963. 
Likewise, foreign law is not controlling in this state and should only be used when 
"confronted with matters of first impression involving Idaho statutes, this Court may glean insight 
from the interpretations of sister states concerning similar or identical statutes." Curlee v. 
Kootenai Cty. Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 396, 224 P.3d 458, 463 (2008) (emphasis added). 
Even then, the foreign law is only persuasive and this Court may refose to adopt the foreign 
construction. Id. 
Regans argue that interpreting "encumbrances" to exclude easements would "place Idaho 
among the majority of courts in other jurisdictions holding that a tax sale does not extinguish prior 
vested easements." Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 17. However, because the language of LC. § 
63-1009 is plain and unambiguous as discussed above, there is no need to consult sources extrinsic 
to the statute. Furthermore, the foreign authority cited by Regans is not based on a similar or 
identical statute to LC. § 63-1009, and therefore should not be considered by this Court in its 
analysis. 
None of the foreign law cited by Regans is based on a statute similar or identical to LC. § 
63-1009. Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 17-19; compare Marshall v. Burker, 162 H.H. 560, 34 
A.3d 705 (H.H. 2011); Hearn v. Autumn Woods Office Park Prop. Owners Ass 'n, 757 So.2d 155 
(Miss. 1999); Alvin v. Johnson, 241 Minn. 257, 63 N.W.2d 22 (Minn. 1954). Those cases are not 
based on statute, but simply state common law. The district court recognized the same when it 
said "[i]t is well recognized that the law of foreign jurisdictions is not controlling and the Court is 
precluded from considering the foreign law where the law in Idaho is clear." 43848 R p. 74. This 
Court has no reason to consider the common law of foreign jurisdictions in applying a clear and 
unambiguous Idaho statute. This Court should reject Regans' invitation to apply foreign law, and 
should affirm the district court's final judgment dismissing the Regans' prescriptive easement 
claim. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO OWENS WITHOUT CONSIDERING IDAHO CODE SECTION 
55-603 BECAUSE THAT ISSUE WAS NEVER RAISED TO THE DISTRICT 
COURT AND IDAHO CODE SECTION 63-1009 CONTROLS IN THE CASE OF 
CONFLICT 
Regans claim error due to the district court's failure to consider LC.§ 55-603 in its decision 
to grant summary judgment. Application of LC. § 55-603 was never raised to the district court. 
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if it had been raised, LC.§ 63-1009 controls over LC.§ 55-603 because it is a more specific 
and recent statute. 
This Court has consistently held that it "will not consider issues that are raised for the first 
time on appeal." Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 580, 21 P.3d 895, 902 (2001); State v. Fodge, 121 
Idaho 192, 824 P.2d 123 (1992). Whether the district court's application of LC. § 63-1009 
conflicts with and violates LC. § 55-603 was never raised below. Regans admit the same in their 
Opening Brief: "the trial court did not receive argument on or address in its opinion whether the 
easement passed with the tax sale pursuant to Idaho Code section 55-603." Appellants' Opening 
Brief, p. 12. Since this Court does not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal, the Court 
should not consider whether the district court's final judgment violated or conflicted with LC. § 
55-603. 
If this Court is inclined to entertain this new issue on appeal, the Court should uphold the 
district court's final judgment because it relied upon the appropriate controlling statute. There is 
a longstanding and foundational rule of statutory construction that when two statutes conflict, the 
more specific statute controls over the more general statute. Ausman v. State, 124 Idaho 839, 842, 
864 P.2d 1126, 1129 (1993); Estate of Collins v. Geist, 143 Idaho 821, 827, 153 P.3d 1167, 1173 
(2007); Gooding Cty. v. Wybenga, 137 Idaho 201,204, 46 P.3d 18, 21 (2002); Tuttle v. Wayment 
Farms, Inc., 131 Idaho 105, 108, 952 P.2d 1241, 1244 (1998); Richardson v. One 1972 GA1C 
Pickup, 121 Idaho 599, 602, 826 P.2d 1311, 1314 (1992); Walker v. Shoshone County, 112 Idaho 
991, 994, 739 P.2d 290,293 (1987); Mickelsen v. City of Rexburg, 101 Idaho 305,307,612 P.2d 
542, 544 (1980); Guillard v. Department of Employment, 100 Idaho 647, 650, 603 P.2d 981, 984 
(1979); State v. Roderick, 85 Idaho 80, 84,375 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1962); John Hancock lvfut. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Neill, 79 Idaho 385,396,319 P.2d 195, 199 (1957). 
related rule construction is that when two statutes conflict, the more recent 
statute controL Roe v. 128 Idaho 917 P.2d 406 996); Tomich v. City 
of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 394, 400, 901 P.2d 501, 507 (1995); Mickelsen, 101 Idaho at 307, 612 
P.2d at 544; Dana, Larson, Roubal & Assocs. v. Board ofComm'rs of Canyon County, 124 Idaho 
794, 801, 864 P.2d 632,639 (Ct.App.1993). 
LC. § 55-603 and its predecessor statutes have existed unchanged since enacted in 1887. 
See Russell v. Irish, 20 Idaho 194, 118 P. 501, 503 (1911 ); Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 12. Idaho 
Code Section 55-603 relates to the continuing existence of existing easements following a transfer 
of real property. In contrast, LC. § 63-1009 as it previously existed was enacted in 1996 and 
related only to transfers of real property by tax deed conveyance. It created a specific exception 
to the general rule in LC. § 55-603. Idaho Code Section 63-1009 was limited to transfers of real 
property by tax deed for the previous 20 years. Because LC.§ 63-1009 was a more recent statute 
and more specific regarding the effect of conveyance by a tax deed on the continuing existence of 
an encumbrance, it was controlling over LC. § 55-602. 
Further, Regans recognize where two statutes on the same subject "can be reconciled and 
construed as to give effect to both, no repeal occurs, and it is the duty of the courts to so construe 
them." State v. Roderick, 85 Idaho 80, 84,375 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1962). Regans also acknowledge 
that courts must interpret statutes "under the assumption the legislature knew of all legal precedent 
and other statutes in existence at the time the statutes were passed." City of Sandpoint Jndep. 
Highway Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 150, 879 P.2d 1078, 1083 (1994). 
Following these established principles of statutory construction support the trial court's 
decision. Interpreting LC. § 63-1009 to convey real property free of easements that are not 
essential to the enjoyment of the land or do not enhance the land's value does not implicitly repeal 
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§ 55-603 as implied by Regans. Appellants' Opening Brief, 13-14. It simply created an 
exception to the general rule set forth LC. § 55-603 in the limited circumstances of a conveyance 
of real property by tax deed. Both statutes are still given effect and there is no nullification or 
repeal. Further, it follows the axiom that the legislature knew the meaning of encumbrances based 
upon prior case law when it passed LC. § 63-1009. Therefore, the district court did not err in 
holding that the Regans' prescriptive easement on the Orphan was an encumbrance extinguished 
by tax deed and this Court should affirm the dismissal of Regans' claim for prescriptive easement. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR BY FAILING TO ADDRESS THE 
VALIDITY OF THE TAX DEED 
Regans claim error below because the district court failed to find the tax deed invalid. The 
district court did not err in giving full effect and validity to the tax deed because its validity was 
never challenged. As previously argued, this Court has repeatedly held that it "will not consider 
issues that are raised for the first time on appeal." Row, 135 Idaho at 580, 21 P.3d at 902; Fodge, 
121 Idaho at 192, 824 P .2d at 123. The validity of the tax deed conveying the Orphan Parcel to 
Kootenai County was not raised below. Therefore, this Court should not consider the issue on 
appeal. 
Further, even if the tax deed issue was raised below, Regans argument lacks merit. Regans 
acknowledge LC.§ 63-1006(6)(c) provides that a tax dee can include the tax number. The Owens 
tax deed at the top contains the tax assessors number immediately below the Exhibit "A", and 
identifies it as Parcel# 50N03W-27-7160. 
Further, the legal description does not reference "extrinsic evidence" as argued by Regans. 
Regans rely upon Wasden v. Foell, 63 Idaho 83, 89, 117 P.2d 465,468 (1941) for the proposition 
that the legal description must not refer to other recorded documents because such references are 
extrinsic facts. This was not the holding of Wasden v. Foell. In Wasden v. Foell, supra, this Court 
found a tax deed legal description was insufficient because it referenced a plat that did not exist. 
Court Wasden v. Foell examined the recorded plats to make its determination the legal 
description was insufficient. It was not critical of a deed that referenced recorded plats. It was 
critical of a deed that referenced no recorded plat. 
In Meneice v. The Blackstone Mining Company, Ltd, 22 Idaho 451, 121 P.2d 450 (1942), 
the Court again examined the sufficiency of a legal description. The Court found a legal 
description was insufficient if one could not examine the record and acquire sufficient data to 
enable him to locate the land taxed. Id. at 417-48, 121 P.2d at 451-452. Following this opinion, 
this Court issued the opinion that "[t]he applicable rule is that a description in an assessment, and 
tax proceedings based thereon, is sufficient if it contains enough information to enable one to 
locate the land taxed. Wilson v. Jarron, 23 Idaho 563, 131 P. 12; Meneice v. Blackstone Mining 
Co., 63 Idaho 413, 121 P.2d 450." Kelson v. Drainage Dist. No. 10 Boundary County, 77 Idaho 
320, 291 P.2d 867, 869 (1955). 
In this matter, the record demonstrates a surveyor was able to examine the deed and record 
to create a survey of the parcel. 40848 R p. 283. Further, the calls in the deed all reference recorded 
instruments. 40848 R p. 70. The record shows information sufficient to enable one to located the 
Orphan Parcel as the land taxed. 
VI. REGANS' DUE PROCESS ISSUE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THIS 
COURT 
Another claim of error by Regans is the district court's failure to properly address their due 
process claim. Regans failed to develop a due process claim in their opposition memorandum to 
Owens' summary judgment other than a statement made in passing that termination of the alleged 
prescriptive easement would be inequitable and a taking of property without due process or just 
compensation. It was merely mentioned in passing such a result would be inequitable. R 43848 p. 
Regans contend on appeal that their due process rights were violated because they were 
not given any notice of the tax sale of the Orphan Parcel. Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 26. Yet 
Regans provide this Court with no citation to evidence in the record to support their claim they did 
not receive notice of the tax sale. That is because the record is devoid of any such evidence. 
Accordingly, this Court must reject Regans' due process argument because it lacks factual support 
and was not properly raised below. For these reasons, this Court should affirm the district court's 
dismissal of the Regans' prescriptive easement claim. 
VII. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO OWENS WITHOUT CONSIDERING RELOCATION OF THE 
EXPRESS EASEMENT 
Regans assert the trial court erred by failing to consider relocation of the express easement 
to the Orphan Parcel on remand. The district court did not err in granting Owens' Third Motion 
for Summary Judgment without considering relocation of the express easement. The trial court 
previously relocated the easement based upon the deed reformation, which was reversed by this 
Court in the first appeal. Regan, 157 ldaho at 761-762, 339 P.3d at 1165-1166. Following remand, 
the Regans did not raise the issue again. 
A. The Relocation of the Express Easement Resulting from Deed Reformation 
was Decided by this Court in its Prior Decision 
One of the issues raised in the first appeal was whether the district court erred in reforming 
the Owens' deed, which resulted in relocating the express easement to the Orphan Parcel. Regan, 
157 Idaho at 761-762, 339 P.3d at 1165-1166. The Court rejected the mutual mistake and deed 
reformation arguments for several reasons. Id. at 762-765, 339 P.3d at 1166-1169. This Court 
vacated the portion of the district court's amended judgment reforming the Owens' deed. Id. at 
339 P.3d at 1169. This Court remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent 
with its decision. Id. 
Regans' sole remaining claim raised in their complaint on remand was their claim to a 
prescriptive easement claim for the benefit of four parcels of land they owned. 43848 R p. 23. 
Fallowing remand, Regans did not raise the issue of relocation of the easement to the district court, 
nor did they seek to amend their complaint to add such a cause of action. 
One reason this Court rejected the Regans' deed reformation argument on the first appeal 
is because that claim was extinguished by the tax deed for the Orphan Parcel to Kootenai County: 
The tax deed conveyed absolute title to the County free of encumbrances ... When 
the county received the tax deed to the Orphan Parcel, that cut off any claim to 
reform the Owen Parcel so that it included the Orphan Parcel The county was 
at that point the absolute owner of the Orphan Parcel. When the Owens later 
purchased the Orphan Parcel, they received the title that the county had. 
Regan, 157 Idaho at 764,339 P.3d at (emphasis added). This Court has already held that all claims 
of Regans to reform the Orphan Parcel have been extinguished by tax sale. This issue has been 
decided and is inappropriate here on the second appeal. 
B. The Issue of Easement Relocation was Not Raised Below Following Remand 
Regans further complain the district court failed to consider relocation of the easement 
under LC. § 55-605. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Owens 
without considering whether the express easement could be relocated pursuant to LC. § 55-605 
because that issue was never raised below. Again, this Court has repeatedly held that it "will not 
consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal." Row, 135 Idaho at 580, 21 P.3d at 902; 
Fodge, 121 Idaho at 192,824 P.2d at 123. 
Following remand from the first appeal the sole remaining claim for trial was Regans' 
prescriptive easement claim. Regans never raised relocation of their express easement below, 
either through a motion to amend the complaint or in opposition to Owens' summary judgment. 
§ as authority to support relocation of their express easement. 
§ 13 as a for easement. 
Relocation of the express easement was not within the scope of remand and was not an issue raised 
below. Therefore, this Court should not consider that issue here on appeal. 
C. Idaho Code Section 55-605 is Inapplicable to the Facts of this Case 
If the Court is inclined to consider whether application of Idaho Code § 55-605 requires 
relocation of Regans' express easement, the Court will conclude that LC. § 55-605 is inapplicable 
to the facts of this case. Idaho Code § 55-605 is the codification of the doctrine of after-acquired 
title: "Where a person purports by proper instrument to convey or grant real property in fee simple, 
and subsequently acquires any title or claim of title thereto, the same passes by operation of law 
to the grantee or his successors." PHH Mortgage Servs. Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 638, 
200 P.3d 1180, 1187 (2009). The key element to that doctrine is the presupposition that "the 
person giving the deed did not have title when purporting to convey the property." Id. 
In this case, the doctrine of after-acquired title codified at LC. § 55-605 is inapplicable 
because the record is devoid of any facts that a predecessor in interest to the Owens ever gave a 
deed for the property without having title at the time of conveyance. There is no evidence in the 
record that when the Original Grantors5 deeded property to Harold and Jean Smart they did not 
hold title to the property at the time of conveyance. See 40848 R. pp. 30-32. Likewise, there is no 
evidence in the record that anyone in the subsequent chain of title for the Owen parcel deeded 
property without holding title at the time of conveyance. See 40848 R. pp. 30-32. 
5 "Original Grantors" refers to Alexander H. Hargis, John W. Acheson, Jr., and R.C. Collins (or the co-personal 
representatives if his estate, M. Eileen Acheson and /or John W. Acheson, Jr., after M. Eileen Acheson passed away) 
as referenced in this Court's first decision. See Regan v. Jeff D., 157 Idaho 758,760,339 P.3d 1162, 1164 (2014). 
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Regans argue that the Original Grantors intended to convey a parcel to the Smarts that 
included the Orphan parcel, but due to a mistake in the legal description, failed to do so. 
Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 34. That argument is essentially an argument for deed reformation. 
It has absolutely no relationship to the doctrine of after-acquired title. The Original Grantors 
conveyed property they owned and there is no evidence in the record of a purported conveyance 
of property not actually owned by the grantor at the time of conveyance, that was later acquired 
by that grantor. Accordingly, had Regans raised Idaho Code Section 55-605 as an issue before the 
district court, it would not have changed the district court's analysis. Likewise, this Court should 
reject Regans' argument and affirm the district court's final judgment. 
After acquiring the tax parcel, the Owens combined it with the parcel they previously 
owned for purposes of tax assessment only. A.R. 411. The form used for this purpose specifically 
informed Owens that the single tax assessment was not a zoning permit which altered the existence 
of the lot in any manner. Id. Despite this fact, Regans present a convoluted argument this action 
relocated the easement because it created one parcel. It did not. It merely created one tax bill. 
Further, it did not relocate the easement as a matter of law. 
D. Idaho Code Section 55-313 is Inapplicable to the Facts of this Case 
Although never raised below, Regans now argue the district court erred in ruling in favor 
of Owens because the district court never considered LC. § 55-313 as a basis to relocate the express 
easement to the Orphan Parcel. If this Court is inclined to entertain this argument on appeal, it 
must conclude that it has no factual basis in this case. 
Idaho Code Section 55-313 gives a servient estate owner the right to relocate an easement 
for motor vehicle access across the servient estate owner's property if the relocation does not injure 
or obstruct the use of the dominant estate(s): 
RELOCATION OF ACCESS. Where, for motor vehicle travel, any access which 
is less than a public dedication, has heretofore been or may hereafter be, constructed 
across private lands, the person or persons owning or controlling the private lands 
shall have the right at their own expense to change such access to any other part of 
the private lands, but such change must be made in such a manner as not to obstruct 
motor vehicle travel, or to otherwise injure any person or persons using or interested 
in such access. (Emphasis added.) 
I. C. § 5 5-313. This statute allows an affirmative action by the servient owner to change an existing 
easement and provide an alternate easement for the dominant estate at the choice and expense of 
the servient estate. It gives no rights to the dominant estate owner to alter the easement. 
In this case, there is no evidence in the record that Owens, after acquiring the Orphan 
Parcel, relocated the express easement to the Orphan Parcel. Owens have consistently admitted in 
this case that their property is burdened by an express easement benefitting one of Regans' parcels. 
40848 AR pp. 163-171. After Regans' received summary judgment on the express easement for 
the benefit of Parcel II, Regans developed this express easement for their use. 
There is no evidence in the record that after acquiring the Orphan Parcel the Owens 
relocated the express easement to the Orphan Parcel. In fact, the contrary evidence exists in the 
record. Regans brought a preliminary injunction to force Owens to allow them to use the Orphan 
Parcel because following the Owens' acquisition of the Orphan Parcel, they fenced and gated the 
Orphan Parcel which prevented Regans' use. See 40848 5/31/12 Preliminary Hearing Transcript 
and 40845 6/4/12 Preliminary Hearing Transcript. Owens opposed the issuance of the preliminary 
injunction to Regans because they had an express easement which provided access. Id. Any use 
by Regans of the Orphan Parcel was pursuant to the trial court's issuance of a preliminary 
injunction. 40848 R pp. 92-94. 
VIII. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DESCRIBING THE LOCATION OF 
THE EXPRESS EASEMENT IN THE FINAL JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE 
WAS NO RELOCATION OF THE EXPRESS EASEMENT 
Regans claim the trial court's final judgment improperly described the location of the 
express easement. The district court did not err in describing the location of the express easement 
in Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the final judgment. As addressed in Section VII above, this Court reversed 
the trial court's previous judgment which resulted in the express easement being relocated to the 
Orphan Parcel due to the deed reformation. It was not error for the trial court to exclude from its 
consideration on remand Regans' claims of mutual mistake and the intent of the original grantors, 
i.e. the deed reformation issues. It would have been error for the trial court to disregard the 
directive of this Court on remand. 
Further, relocation of the easement was not within the scope of matters remanded to the 
district court. Regans' previous summary judgment, which was granted, requested entry of 
judgment that Regans' had an express easement across Owens' parcel Regans' only remaining 
claim following remand was their prescriptive easement claim. At no time following remand did 
Regans request to reform their pleadings to include a cause of action for relocation based on the 
statutes they now raise, nor did they raise the issue when Owens moved for summary judgment on 
remand. 
Finally, none of Regans' new relocation arguments have merit. As previously discussed, 
had Regans raised these issues to the trial court, they would not have prevailed. This Court should 
affirm the district court's final judgment, including the location of the express easement. 
IX. REGANS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO COSTS OR ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Regans cite to Idaho Code § 12-121 as a statutory basis for an award of attorney fees on 
appeal. Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 3 8-3 9. As discussed above, an award of attorney fees under 
I.C. § 12-121 is only appropriate when "the Court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was 
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Chavez, 146 Idaho 
at 1 P.3d at 1049. Owens defense in this appeal is not frivolous. To the contrary, Owens 
the Court with vast amounts of case law, statute, and facts from the record that support 
this Court's affirmation of the district court's final decision. Accordingly, Regans are not entitled 
to their attorney fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Before this litigation commenced, in a letter to Owens' counsel, Regans' counsel claimed 
" ... I am informed that Mr. Regan actually prefers the north 30 feet of parcel #3600 for the location 
of an access road. That location is several feet higher than the existing road and would therefore 
have better drainage in the winter." AR. 266. Owens admitted in their answer Regans had an 
express easement in this location. Regans constructed a road in this location after receiving a 
summary judgment that their express easement was in that location. It defies logic and exemplifies 
frivolous and vexatious litigation for Regans to continue to pursue claims at this point that the 
easement should cross the Orphan Parcel. 
For the reasons stated above the Owens respectfully request this Court affirm the final 
judgment of the district court and grant an award of reasonable attorney fees to Owens for the 
defense of the frivolous issues presented by Regans on this appeal. 
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